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2026-08-09 China–US–Canada Macro Baseline

Information cutoff: 2026-08-09 23:59 ET. This page is frozen afterward. Later data belong in a new slice; source or transcription errors receive a dated correction rather than a quiet rewrite.

Summary​

The baseline is not a synchronized three-country recession. It is divergent growth under a persistent inflation constraint: China's real growth remains resilient while manufacturing and property expose domestic-demand pressure; US activity is solid and the Fed still sees above-target inflation; Canada shows signs of recovery but retains slack and high external sensitivity.

Current posterior:

Exclusive scenario through 2026 Q4PriorComposite LRNormalizedPublished probability
S1 Divergent soft landing: steadier US, slower but intact China, modest Canadian recovery45%1.3052.7%55%
S2 Synchronized upside: demand and trade improve together25%0.7015.8%15%
S3 Persistent supply shock/inflation: growth survives but easing is constrained20%1.3524.3%25%
S4 Trade or financial shock produces a hard landing10%0.807.2%5%

Published probabilities are rounded to five points and rebalanced. Composite likelihood ratios discount correlated evidence; their display precision is not statistical estimation.

Correction — 2026-09-07: overlapping scenarios​

The table above is preserved as originally published, but its “exclusive” label is incorrect. S1's divergent soft landing can coexist with S3's persistent inflation constraint; S2's stronger demand could also coexist with that constraint. Normalizing the weights to 100% does not make these descriptions a mutually exclusive, exhaustive partition. The displayed values therefore cannot be used as a coherent categorical posterior or scored as a resolved four-way forecast.

A future snapshot needs an observation horizon, measurable classification rules, and a stated priority for overlapping conditions, or it should forecast these dimensions separately without forcing their probabilities to sum to 100%. The Bayesian method explains why event definitions must precede normalization. This correction adds no later macro data and does not alter the original priors, likelihood ratios, or five separately defined forecasts below; those forecasts retain their own resolution rules.

Observation Record​

China​

  • The National Bureau of Statistics' preliminary estimate put real GDP growth at 4.3% year over year in Q2 2026 and 4.7% in the first half.
  • July's manufacturing PMI was 49.2, down 1.1 points from June. Production, new orders, inventories, employment, and delivery-time components were all below the threshold.
  • Real-estate development investment fell 18.0% year over year in January–June, while commercial-building floor space sold fell 11.6%.

Interpretation: GDP does not yet show a hard landing, but manufacturing and property point to weak demand. Those indicators partly share one domestic-demand mechanism and are not treated as three independent strong signals. Relative service-sector strength keeps S4 low rather than zero.

United States​

  • On July 29, the FOMC maintained the federal-funds target at 3.50%–3.75%. It described solid activity, strong capital investment and productivity, and inflation above its 2% goal; three voters preferred a 25bp increase.
  • BEA reported that June nominal personal income rose 0.2% month over month, PCE rose 0.3%, and the personal saving rate was 2.7%.

Interpretation: Current evidence does not indicate an imminent demand cliff, but neither does it imply frictionless rate cuts. A low saving rate can support current consumption while leaving a thinner buffer; one month of nominal data cannot distinguish those effects.

Canada​

  • The Bank of Canada maintained its overnight target at 2.25% on July 15.
  • It estimated Q2 growth near 2.5%, but only 0.7% for 2026 as a whole; June unemployment was 6.5%.
  • May CPI inflation was 3.2%, attributed mainly to gasoline. Excluding gasoline it was 2.2%, and core measures were near 2%.

Interpretation: Recovery and slack can coexist. Canada has more room than the United States to ease, but oil, the Canadian dollar, and Canada–US trade prevent a simple one-direction inference.

Cross-Border Constraints​

The current gap between the Fed target midpoint and Canada's overnight target is about 137.5bp. That supports relatively easier Canadian financial conditions, but may weaken the Canadian dollar and import some inflation. US demand supports Canadian exports, while weaker Chinese manufacturing and the property adjustment pose the opposite risk to commodity demand.

From Evidence to Posterior​

Evidence groupS1S2S3S4Update rationale
China's growth compositionSupportAgainstNeutralMild supportAggregate resilience with weak manufacturing and property
US activity and FedSupportMildly againstSupportAgainstSolid activity but a binding inflation constraint
Canadian recovery and slackSupportMild supportMild supportNeutralRecovery has not removed slack or external risk
Cross-border and supply riskNeutralAgainstSupportMild supportRate gaps, energy, and trade policy widen tails

The rows were not multiplied mechanically. US and Canadian gasoline inflation share an external supply shock; Chinese PMI and property share a demand shock. The composite LR discounts both dependencies.

First Forecasts​

Formal resolution rules live in the forecast and review ledger.

IDDeadlineResolvable eventProbability
M-202608-012026-10-31China's official Q3 2026 real GDP growth is at least 4.0% year over year70%
M-202608-022026-11-01At least two published China manufacturing PMIs for August–October 2026 are below 5065%
M-202608-032026-12-31The lower bound of the federal-funds target is at least 3.50%70%
M-202608-042026-12-31The Bank of Canada overnight target is at or below 2.25%70%
M-202608-052026-12-31The Fed target midpoint minus Canada's overnight target is at least 125bp65%

Next Checks​

  • 2026-09-09: T+30 leading-signal check; append a note but do not change probabilities early.
  • 2026-11-10: create the next quarterly slice and settle published China Q3 GDP and PMI calls.
  • 2027-01-15: settle year-end rate calls and calculate the first Brier scores.

The largest uncertainty is not a decimal point of GDP. It is the nonlinear interaction among external supply shocks, trade policy, and policy reactions. Those belong in explicit tail scenarios rather than being buried and forgotten inside the baseline narrative.

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